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Recent Decisions

The Fifteenth Amendment's Prohibition Against
State Suffrage Restrictions Based upon Race
Encompasses Ancestral Restrictions That Are Used
as Substitutes for Race: Rice v. Cayetano
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw -

RIGHT OF

CITIZENS TO VOTE -

FIFTEENTH

AMENDMENT - The Supreme Court of the United States held that
State voter eligibility statutes that limit suffrage to only those
persons meeting a statutorily defined ancestry are prohibited by the
Fifteenth Amendment when the legislative purpose behind the
ancestral definition is to treat those defined persons as a distinct
people so that ancestry becomes a proxy for race.
Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000).
In 1996, petitioner Harold F Rice, a citizen of the State of
Hawaii, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Hawaii, alleging that the State of Hawaii's basis for denying his
application to vote for trustees for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
("OHA") was a violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.' The OHA was
established by state constitutional amendment in 1978 and was
vested with a mission to provide for "the betterment of conditions
of native Hawaiians [and] Hawaiians." 2 Eligible voters for the OHAs
nine-member board of trustees are limited to those persons who
1. Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F.Supp. 1547 (D. Haw. 1997). Rice sued the Governor of
Hawaii, Benjamin Cayetano, in his official capacity. Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044, 1054
(2000). Accordingly, the Attorney General of Hawaii defended the suit. Id.
2. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1052.
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are "Hawaiian" as defined by state statute.3 Petitioner Rice did not
meet this statutory requirement. Therefore, the State of Hawaii
refused to approve Rice's voter registration, and Rice brought the
5
instant case.
In 1997, both petitioner Rice and respondent State motioned the
.district court for partial summary judgment on the issue.6 The
district court held that the United States government and the State
of Hawaii had a guardian-ward relationship similar to the
relationship between Congress and the various Indian tribes, and
thus concluded that Hawaii's voting restriction was based on the
special status of native Hawaiians and not upon race.7 In so finding,
the court relied primarily upon the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Morton v. Mancari.8 The court then applied the rational
basis test,9 which is the same level of scrutiny adopted by the
Supreme Court in controversies involving Indian legislation that
3. The applicable Hawaiian statute states:
"Hawaiian" means any descendant of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian
Islands which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778,
and which peoples thereafter have continued to reside in Hawaii.
"Native Hawaiian" means any descendant of not less than one-half part of the races
inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778, as defined by the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act, 1920, as amended; provided that the term identically refers to the
descendants of such blood quantum of such aboriginal peoples which exercised
sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778 and which peoples
thereafter continued to reside in Hawaii.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10-2 (1993). By definition, any "Native Hawaiian" would also be considered
"Hawaiian." Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1047.
4. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1047. Rice, a Caucasian, was born in and is a current resident of
Hawaii. Rice, 963 F.Supp. at 1548. He was able to trace his lineage back to a time prior to
the 1893 United States assisted overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy. Id. He was not,
however, a descendant of a person residing in Hawaii in 1778 or anytime before 1778. Rice,
120 S. Ct. at 1053. The year 1778 is used as a line of demarcation because it marks the year
when the first Westerner, England's Captain Cook, landed on the island. Id. at 1048-53.
Consequently, it also marked the beginning of Western influences upon the Hawaiian culture
and the end of the isolation of the island. Id.
5. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1047.
6. Rice, 963 FSupp. at 1549. In Rice v. Cayetano, 941 FSupp. 1529 (D. Haw. 1996), a
related case, the district court denied Rice's request for a preliminary injunction barring the
State of Hawaii from announcing the results of the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Election.
Rice, 941 FSupp. at 1536. The district court declined to issue the injunction on the basis that
Rice was unlikely to prevail on either his Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment claims. Id. at
1545.
7. Rice, 963 FSupp. at 1555.
8. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). The Supreme Court found that special employment preferences
for Indian tribe members were not based upon racial classifications, but were instead
grounded in the special relationship that existed between the government and Indian tribes
and the tribe's special quasi-sovereign status. Id. at 554.
9. Rice, 963 FSupp. at 1551-54.
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singles out Indians for special treatment, to determine if Hawaii's
voting restriction was rationally related to its fiduciary duty to
native Hawaiians. 10 The court held that because the OHA was
created to benefit native Hawaiians and Hawaiians, the State's
action in limiting eligible OHA voters to the beneficiaries of OHA
programs was rationally related to the State's trust obligations."
Consequently, the petitioner's summary judgement motion was
denied and the State of Hawaii's motion was granted by the district
court.

12

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
despite finding that the State's eligibility requirement contained
racial classifications. 13 The court presumed that the establishment
and structure of the trusts and the OHA were constitutionally valid
because neither the constitutionality of the OHA, itself, nor the
programs it administers were challenged by Rice. 14 Therefore, the
court concluded that because the trusts and the OHA were lawfully
created for the benefit of Hawaiians, limiting trustee voters to
those who are beneficiaries of the trust was in reality a
qualification based on beneficiary status as opposed to race. 15
However, unlike the district court, the court of appeals did not
consider Mancari to be controlling because it considered
Hawaiians to be distinguishable from Indians.1 Even so, the court
10. Id. "[Liegislation based upon racial classifications is Constitutionally suspect under
the Equal Protection Clause and should be viewed under strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court
has held, however, in the context of Native American Indians, that . . . race-conscious
legislation is valid utilizing the . . . rational basis test." Id. (citations omitted). See also
Mancari, 94 S. Ct. at 2485 (holding that an Indian employment preference does not
constitute racial discrimination or even a racial preference, but is instead a rational design to
promote Indian self-government).
11. Rice, 963 FSupp. at 1555-58. The district court relied on the United States Supreme
Court decision in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District and its
progeny. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). In Salyer, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's
one person, one vote" rule did not pertain to certain "special purpose districts,"
notwithstanding the fact that the district at issue had some governmental authority. Id. at
726.
12. Rice, 963 FSupp. at 1548-49.
13. Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1998). "Rice is, of course, quite right that
the Hawaii Constitution and Haw.Rev.Stat. § 13D-3 contain a racial classification on their
face." Id. at 1079.
14. Id. "[Tihe Constitutionality of the racial classification that underlies the trusts and
OHA is not challenged in this case. This means that we must accept the trusts and their
administrative structure as we find them, and assume that both are lawful." Id.
15. Id. "[Tihe voting restriction is not primarily racial, but legal or political." Id.
16. Id. at 1081. "[Wie recognize that Mancari is distinguishable because Hawaiians are
not exactly like Indians (for example, they aren't organized in tribes and there isn't an
Hawaiian Commerce Clause in the Constitution), and we do not regard ... Mancari . . . as

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39:217

believed that Mancari did stand for the principal that a racially
restrictive voting scheme may be appropriate when there is a
unique fiduciary relationship that led to the restrictive design, 17 and
in this sense Mancari was indeed similar to the instant case. 8 The
court of appeals found that Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage District and its progeny controlled the instant case
because the OHA trustee vote is a special purpose election similar
to the election scheme in the Salyer line of cases. 19 The court,
therefore, concluded that although Hawaii's voter restriction was
suspect because it was based upon a racial classification, it,
nevertheless, should survive strict scrutiny because the racial
classification, itself, was based on beneficiary status which is
20
permissible in special purpose elections such as the OHA election.
Rice appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari 1 to decide whether Hawaii's voting requirement which
limits the right to vote for the trustees of the OHA to the
"descendant[s] of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian
Islands which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian
Islands in 1778, and which peoples thereafter have continued to
reside in Hawaii" discriminates on the basis of race in violation of
22
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that the State's
voting qualification makes distinctions among people based on their
ancestry, and in that manner, ancestry was being used as a
controlling." Id.
17. Id. "Mancari indicate[s] that we are not compelled to invalidate the voting
restriction simply because it appears to be race-based without also considering the unique
trust relationship that gave rise to it." Id.
18. Rice, 146 F.3d at 1081. "[Tjhe special treatment of Hawaiians and native Hawaiians
reflected in establishment of trusts for their benefit, and the creation of OHA to administer
them, is similar to the special treatment of Indians that the Supreme Court approved in
Morton v. Mancari." Id.
19. Id. at 1080. "In these respects the trustee elections are like the special purpose
elections upheld in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist." Id. "[E]lections . . . held for
special purposes and voter qualifications that might otherwise be invalid may survive when
they limit eligible voters to those who are disproportionately affected and the government
agency does not perform fundamentally governmental functions." Id.
20. Id. at 1082. "[E]ven if the voting restriction must be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny because the classification is based explicitly on race, it survives because the
restriction is rooted in the special trust relationship between Hawaii and descendants of
aboriginal peoples .... ." Id.
21. Certiorari is defined as a "writ of common law origin issued by a superior to an
inferior court requiring the latter to produce a certified record of a particular case tried
therein." BLACK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 156 (6th ed. 1991). The United States Supreme Court "uses
the writ of certiorari as a discretionary device to choose the cases it wishes to hear." Id.
22. HAw. CONsT. art. XII, § 5; HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-2 (1993).
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substitute for race in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment's
mandate that people not be denied the right to vote because of
their race.Y The majority reached this conclusion by first exploring
the island of Hawaii's vast history, but limited this chronicle to the
lawmakers' perspective so that proper deference could be given to
the lawmakers' purposes in enacting the laws that were challenged.
24
in the current case.
The Court next examined the purpose and scope of the Fifteenth
Amendment's mandate. 25 While noting that the Fifteenth
Amendment was enacted just after the end of the Civil War, Justice
Kennedy cautioned that the Fifteenth Amendment was not and is
26
not merely a suffrage edict for the then newly emancipated slaves.
Rather, it is made applicable to all persons regardless of race
because, like the Constitution itself, the Fifteenth Amendment's
mandates go beyond the political climate and controversies that
prompted its ratification. 27 For this same reason, the Court believed
that precedents established through its adjudication of Fifteenth
Amendment cases in which it invalidated various State attempts to
deny African American suffrage were relevant to the current
28
controversy.
The Court established through its examination of Guinn v.
United States29 and other Fifteenth Amendment cases that
23. Rice, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia
and Thomas joined Justice Kennedy in his opinion.
24. Id. at 1049-51. The term "Native Hawaiian" and its corresponding 1778 date were
first used by Congress when it became concerned with the condition of the Hawaiian
territory's aboriginal peoples and enacted the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1921 to
address this concern. Id. at 1052-53. The year 1778 was used to identify "Native Hawaiians"
because it marks the year when the first Westerner, England's Captain Cook, landed on the
island. Id. at 1048. At the time of Cook's landing, the inhabitants of the islands had
developed their own distinct culture. Id. It is this culture that the legislators were attempting
to preserve because after Cook's arrival, the Hawaiian culture began to erode due to Western
influences and the end of the island's migratory isolation. Id. at 1048-53.
25. Id. at 1054. "The purpose and command of the Fifteenth Amendment are set forth
in language both explicit and comprehensive. The National Government and the States may
not violate a fundamental principle: They may not deny or abridge the right to vote on
account of race." Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1054-55.
29. In Guinn v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated an amendment to the
Oklahoma Constitution that required voters to pass a literacy test before they were permitted
to vote; but it included an exemption for persons meeting specific ancestral qualifications.
238 U.S. 347 (1915). The State of Oklahoma's literacy test for determining voter eligibility did
not require persons with "lineal descendant[s]" who on or before January 1, 1866, were
either entitled to vote or resided in a foreign country to take the test. Id. at 357. The Court
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lawmakers have sometimes used ancestry as an unconstitutional
substitute for race.3 0 Next, the Court examined Hawaii's contention
that its statute classified persons based merely on whether or not
they had an ancestor, regardless of that ancestor's race, residing in
the State at a specific time in the past.3' The majority found this
argument to be incompatible with both the -conclusions drawn in
scholarly accounts of Hawaiian history as well as the views held by
drafters of the statutory definition at issue.32 These writings led the
Court to conclude that the ancestral inhabitants of Hawaii at issue
are an "identifiable class of persons."3 Justice Kennedy then noted
that in an earlier civil rights case, the Court had defined "racial
discrimination" as "that which singles out identifiable classes of
persons
. .
solely because of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics."34
By examining the history of the State's statutory definition of
"Hawaiian," Justice Kennedy demonstrated that the term was
actually a "racial definition" used for a "racial purpose."-" Justice
Kennedy also stipulated that the mere fact that the ancestral
definition at issue would put people of the same race within
different classifications does not serve to make the classifications
any less racial. 36 The majority, therefore, concluded that "ancestral
tracing of this sort achieves its purpose by creating a legal category
concluded that although the State's amendment did not expressly exclude voters, based on
their race, it, nevertheless, operated in a manner that resulted in a race based exclusion and
was, therefore, merely an unconstitutional attempt to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court invalidated the law because January 1, 1866, was prior to the enactment
of the Fifteenth Amendment; therefore, the amendment perpetuated old racially
discriminatory voting laws that were unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at
364-65.
30. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1056.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1055-56. These works illustrate that because the islands had been isolated
prior to 1778, the Hawaiians had established their own customs, religion, and political
structure, and shared common physical characteristics, all of which were distinct from other
Polynesian societies. Id. It was this distinct class of people that Hawaii's legislature was
seeking to protect. Id.
33. Id. at 1056.
34. Id. (quoting Saint Francis College v. Al Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987)).
35. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1056. These reports show that in the State's current revised
definition of "Hawaiian" the word "peoples" had been substituted for. "races" and in the
revised definition of "Native Hawaiian" the phrase "descendants of the races" was changed to
"descendants of the aboriginal peoples." Id. However, the drafters of the revised definitions
stressed that neither change was material. Id.
36. Id. "Simply because a class defined by ancestry does not include all members of
the race does not suffice to make the classification race neutral. Here, the State's argument
is undermined by its express racial purpose and by its actual effects." Id.
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which employs the same mechanisms, and causes the same
injuries, as laws or statutes that use race by name. The 7State's
electoral restriction enacts a race-based voting qualification."
The majority then addressed three principal defenses that the
State raised to show that its statute should be found constitutional
despite its racial classification. 38 Hawaii's first defense was that the
political status of Hawaiians is analogous to the status of Native
American Indians, and that, as such, the racial classification should
be found constitutional under Supreme Court cases permitting
differential treatment of Indian tribes. 39 However, the Court
rejected this argument without deciding if Hawaiians should be
afforded the same political status as Indian tribes.40 Instead, the
majority determined that even if Hawaiians shared the same status
as Indian tribes, the State's argument would still fail 4' because the
OHA is a State agency,42 making it subject to the Fifteenth
Amendment, whereas a tribal election is "the internal affair of a
quasi-sovereign."" The Court arrived at this conclusion by
distinguishing Mancari's tribal Indian hiring preference for
positions at the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs from Hawaii's
restrictive voting scheme for some of its public officials." The
State's second contention was that its voting requirement should be
valid under the Supreme Court's Sayler line of decisions that held
that the Fourteenth Amendment's "one person, one vote" rule
should not be applied to special purpose districts. 45 Without
37. Id. at 1057.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1057-58. "Itis a matter of some dispute, for instance, whether
Congress may treat the native Hawaiians as it does the Indian tribes. We can stay far off that
difficult terrain, however. The State's argument fails for a more basic reason." Id. (citations
omitted).
41. Id.at 1058. "Even were we to take the substantial step of finding authority, in
Congress, delegated to the State, to treat Hawaiians or native Hawaiians as tribes, Congress
may not authorize a State to create a voting scheme of this sort." Id.
42. Id. at 1058-59. "OHA is a state agency, established by the State Constitution,
responsible for the administration of state laws and obligations." Id. "[OHA] [is] independent
from the executive branch and all other branches of government although it [has] the status
of a state agency." Id. at 1059.
43. Id. at 1058-59. "If a non-Indian lacks a right to vote in tribal elections, it is for the
reason that such elections are the internal affair of a quasi-sovereign. The OHA elections, by
contrast, are the affair of the State of Hawaii." Id.
44. Id. at 1058. "It does not follow from Mancari . . . that Congress may authorize a
State to establish a voting scheme that limits the electorate for its public officials to a class
of tribal Indians, to the exclusion of all non-Indian citizens." Id.
45. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1059-60.
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deciding whether the "one person, one vote" rule could ever be
extended to statewide elections for a State agency such as the
OHA, the Court dismissed the State's argument by holding that
compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment in no way absolves a
46
statute's noncompliance with the Fifteenth Amendment.
The State's final argument was that its voting franchise is limited
to the beneficiaries of the trust that the OHA administers, not upon
the voter's race. 47 The Court noted that while it is not clear that
there is a proportional balance between qualified OHA voters and
OHA beneficiaries, 48 limiting the voting franchise in this way is
offensive to the Fifteenth Amendment's mandate that race should
49
not be determinative in establishing voting qualifications.
Moreover, according to the majority, the fundamental failure of the
State's final contention was that the State's attempt to limit
qualified voters to trust beneficiaries was essentially a race-based
qualification.50 According to the Court, the State, by following this
approach, was making an invalid assumption that those persons
who did not share the same race as the trust beneficiaries were
either less qualified or could not be trusted to vote ethically
51
because of their race.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, agreed with the majority
in its holding that Hawaii's voter limitation was unconstitutional,
but wrote separately to expressly reject the State's attempt to
analogize the OHA to a government trust for Indian tribes. 52 Justice
Breyer would have found that the OHA did not administer a trust
for native Hawaiians in the same sense as a trust of an Indian tribe
because the trust at issue was established to benefit all citizens of
Hawaii, with only a portion devoted to native Hawaiians.'
46. Id. at 1060. "The Fifteenth Amendment has independent meaning and force. A State
may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, and this law does so." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Court stated that:
Although the bulk of the funds for which OHA is responsible appears to be
earmarked for the benefit of "native Hawaiians," the State permits both "native
Hawaiians" and "Hawaiians" to vote for the office of trustee. The classification thus
appears to create, not eliminate, a differential alignment between the identity of OHA
trustees and what the State calls beneficiaries.
Id.
49. Id. "The State's position rests, in the end, on the demeaning premise that citizens of
a particular race are somehow more qualified than others to vote on certain matters." Id.
50. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1060.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1060-61 (Breyer, J., concurring).
53. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Admissions Act §5 (f) provides that:
The lands granted to the State of Hawaii by subsection (b) of this section and
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Additionally, the Justices agreed with the majority that the OHA
was a state agency, but based this conclusion on the source of the
OHA's funding and the fact that the funding sources as well as the
amount that the OHA received could be changed at any time
through the normal state legislative process. 54 Justice Breyer
thought that it was equally important that the State of Hawaii
created the "native Hawaiian" and "Hawaiian" definitions while
Indian tribes defined their own membership, and that the State's
55
definition was much broader than any Indian tribe definition.
Accordingly, the concurring Justices would have held that the
analogy drawn by the State was improper because it was too
remote to insulate the State's facially racial classification from
56
Fifteenth Amendment mandates.
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the Court's
decision because, in their view, the majority ignored the history of
Hawaii and the efforts made by the federal government to
compensate for the past wrongs it had committed against all
indigenous peoples of the United States. 57 The dissent believed the
Court should have followed the long history of cases which have
recognized, first, that Congress is afforded plenary power over the
indigenous peoples of the United States, 58 native Hawaiians being
among those indigenous peoples; and, second, that a special
guardian-ward relationship exists between the government and
indigenous peoples.5 9 Therefore, in keeping with this line of cases,
the Justices would have applied the rational basis test to uphold
public lands retained by the United States under subsections (c) and (d) and later
conveyed to the State under subsection (e), together with the proceeds from the sale
or other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said
State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public
educational institutions, for the "betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as
defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the
development of farm and home ownership on as widespread a basis as possible for
the making of public improvements, and for the provision of lands for public use.
73 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 5. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 1061 (Breyer, J., concurring).
55. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1061-62 (Breyer, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 1062 (Breyer, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 1062-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1063-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 531 n.6 (1998); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978);
United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977); Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551; Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-65 (1903); and United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)).
59. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28 (1913); Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384-85; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 18
(1831)).
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Hawaii's voting requirement because the special treatment afforded
Hawaiians under that scheme was rationally related to the
60
government's fiduciary duty to preserve Hawaiian culture.
The dissenters also noted that the existence of a special fiduciary
relationship between the United States government and native
Hawaiians could not be seriously doubted due to the existence of
many federal laws that afford special treatment to native Hawaiians
by including them within indigenous peoples classifications that
have
withstood
6onstitutional
challenge."
The majority's
quasi-sovereign principal was rejected by the dissenters because
they believed it was unreasonable for the Court to require some
remnant of native self-government when the federal government,
itself, played a large part in the destruction of native Hawaiian
62
Sovereignty.
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, unlike the majority, would not
have found the fact that the OHA was entirely within the State's
province to be determinative because, as they previously
established, the federal government has a trust responsibility to
native Hawaiians and, as previous case law has established,
Congress may delegate this responsibility to the states provided
that state laws be enacted to fulfill the objective of federal law.6
According to the dissent, the Hawaii statute at issue was enacted in
furtherance of the Admissions Act, and through it, the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act.64
Justice Stevens also would have rejected the majority's
contention that ancestry was being used as a racial classification
because the ancestry requirement used in Hawaii's voting scheme is
distinguishable from those cases in which the Court has found that
such an unconstitutional proxy has occurred. 65 According to Justice
Stevens, the majority should have exa.nined Hawaii's ancestral
60. Id. at 1064-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Statutes recognizing native Hawaiians as a
class of persons subject to the same rights and privileges extended to other indigenous
peoples totaled more than 150 at the time of the Court's opinion according to the Brief for
the Hawaiian Congressional Delegation that was cited by the dissent. See Brief for Hawaiian
Congressional Delegation as Amicus Curiae at 4, A.A., Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044
(2000) (No. 98-818).
62. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The state statutory and Constitutional scheme
here was without question intended to implement the express desires of the Federal
Government." Id. at 1067-68 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg did not join in this part or
in the remainder of Justice Stevens's opinion. Id. at 1062.
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classification in the same manner and to the same extent that the
Court analyzed earlier Fifteenth Amendment cases; his suggestion
was that the Court should have looked to "the realities of time,
66
place, and history behind the voting restrictions being tested."
This type of inquiry, in Justice Stevens's view, shows that the
purposes behind each of the State's statutory classifications were
completely the opposite.6 1 In each of the earlier Fifteenth
Amendment cases, the statutory classifications were designed
maliciously to deny the right to vote to at least one group of
persons based on their race; whereas, Hawaii's classification was
intended to provide some measure of autonomy to native
Hawaiians. 68
Justice Stevens noted that limiting qualified trustee voters to
those persons who are the beneficiaries of the trust is neither
69
unique nor unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment.
Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens believed the fact that Hawaii
had extended the voter qualification to include "Hawaiians" did not
serve to make the classification any less a beneficiary
classification. 0 Instead, he concluded that the purpose of the
expansion was not to deny suffrage, but rather was to ensure the
survival of Hawaiian culture, which itself demonstrated that
71
Hawaii's voting scheme was not based upon racial differences.
In further support of his contention that Hawaii's voting
restriction was not racially motivated, Justice Stevens pointed out
that the ancestral classification is both too broad and too narrow in
its definition to be solely race-based because it includes "[any]
descendant of a 1778 resident [regardless of whether] he or she is
also part European, Asian, or African" and it "excludes all
full-blooded Polynesians currently residing in Hawaii who are not
descended from a 1778 resident of Hawaii."72 Finally, Justice
Stevens rejected the majority's view that Hawaii's voting limitation
is "demeaning" or would likely become an "instrument for
generating prejudice and hostility" because the statutory scheme at
66. Id. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Rice,. 120 S. Ct. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1070 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing A. Sco'r & W. FRATCHER, LAW OF TRUSTS §
108.3 (4th ed. 1987)).
70. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1070 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[T]here is surely nothing racially invidious about a
decision to enlarge the class of eligible voters to include 'any descendant' of a 1778 resident
of the Islands." Id.
72. Id. at 1071 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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issue was enacted by the vote of all of the citizens of Hawaii, the
majority of whom are non-Hawaiian and would, therefore, not be
entitled to vote for the OHA trustees.7 3
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate dissenting opinion in order to
emphasize that Congress, in keeping with its authority prescribed
by the Court in Mancari, has singled out native Hawaiians for
special treatment, just as it has Native Americans.7 4 Thus, according
to Justice Ginsburg, Hawaii, through the authority delegated to it
by Congress, could constitutionally have established the challenged
voting scheme because it was "rationally related" to the furtherance
75
of the State's fiduciary responsibility to its indigenous peoples.
In 1869, following intense debate, 76 the Fifteenth Amendment was
passed by the Fortieth Congress; it was subsequently presented to
the legislatures of the states. 77 The states ratified the amendment in
1870.78 The Supreme Court's earliest cases interpreting the Fifteenth
Amendment held that the amendment does not confer the right to
vote upon any person, but rather prevents a state from denying
equally qualified voters the right to vote merely because of their
79
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
73. Id. at 1071-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "One of the principal reasons race is treated
as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be
judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities." Id. at 1057.
"The law itself may... become the instrument for generating the prejudice and hostility all
too often directed against persons whose particular ancestry is disclosed by their ethnic
characteristics and cultural traditions." Id.
74. Id. at 1073 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 6, Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000) (No. 98-818). (contending that Hawaii's
voting law derives from federal policies on behalf of "indigenous people of a once-sovereign
nation with a unique trust relationship to the United States").
75. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1073 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76.

WILLm GILLETrE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: PoLITIcs AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH

AMENDMENT 46-78 (1965). Congress was divided by three opposing views. One group was
completely opposed to any Constitutional guarantee of African American suffrage. The
second group supported universal male suffrage that would eliminate all property ownership
requirements and literacy tests. The final group included those who endorsed an amendment
that prohibited the use of racial qualifications in determining voter eligibility, while leaving
the states free to continue or establish any other voting requirements. The latter faction
prevailed. Id. See also B. SHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES - CIVIL RIGHTS
(1971).
77. GILLETrE, supra note 76, at 73.
78. Id. at 153.
79. For example, in United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1875), two inspectors
of a Kentucky municipal election were indicted, under a federal penal statute, for refusing to
accept and count the vote of William Garner, an African American citizen. The Court found
that the statute was beyond congressional authority under the Fifteenth Amendment because
it did not limit those persons subject to punishment to those who wrongfully refused to
allow a person to vote in an election solely because of that potential voter's race, color, or
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However, within ten years, in the Klu Klux Klan cases,

229
0

the

Delaware l

Court revisited this issue in Neal v.
and conceded that
in some circumstances the Fifteenth Amendment might, in fact and
effect, grant an affirmative right to vote. 82 The origin of Neal was
Delaware's failure to alter its .constitution after the passage of the
Fifteenth Amendment so that "white man" remained a qualification
for the right to vote in the State.83 The Court held that the word
"white" was automatically struck from Delaware's Constitution by
operation of the Fifteenth Amendment,84 thereby conferring the
85
right to vote upon previously disqualified persons.
Another salient aspect of the early cases was the Court's
apparent espousal of the view that the Fifteenth Amendment not
only reaches discriminatory state action, but also private action
that deprives individuals of their right to vote.86 However, in James
previous condition of servitude. Id. at 219-22. See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 566 (1876) (approving Reese by holding that the Fifteenth Amendment does not confer
the right of suffrage upon any persons).
80. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (stating that the federal statute at issue
was enacted by Congress in response to the intimidation of African American voters by the
Klu Klux Klan).
81. 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
82. See Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 666 (stating that "while it is quite true, as was said by
this court in U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875), that this article gives no affimnative right to
the colored man to vote ... it is easy to see that under some circumstances it may operate
as the immediate source of a right to vote.").
83. Neal, 103 U.S. at 380.
84. Id. at 389. "Beyond question the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment had the
effect, in law, to remove from the State Constitution, or render inoperative, that provision
which restricts the right of suffrage to the white race." Id.
85. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 666. "In all cases where the former slave-holding states had
not removed from their constitutions the words 'white man' as a qualification for voting, this
provision did, in effect, confer on him the right to vote, because, being paramount to the
state law, and a part of the state law, it annulled the discriminating word 'white,' and thus
left him in the enjoyment of the same right as white persons." Id.
86. See, e.g., Reese, 92 U.S. at 217 (stating that "the amendment has invested the
citizens of the United States with a new Constitutional right which is within the protecting
power of Congress. That right is exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the
elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."). In United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555 (1876), two of several criminal indictments, based upon
section 6 of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, charged the defendants with conspiring to
prevent two African Americans from exercising their right to vote. Section 6 of the
Enforcement Act was directed at private action. Id. at 548. The Court rejected the
indictments, not because the statute in penalizing private discriminatory action was beyond
the reach of Congress's authority under the Fifteenth Amendment, but because of the lack of
evidence that the defendants intended to prevent the African Americans from voting. Id. at
56. Although Yarbrough involved Congressional ability to reach private action that interfered
with an African American's right to vote in a federal election, the Court stated in that case
that "while it may be true that acts [that] have no sanction in the statutes of a state .. .are
not within the scope of [the Fourteenth] amendment, it is quite a different matter when
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v. Bowman,8 7 Justice Brewer, writing for the majority, held that
remedial legislation under the Fifteenth Amendment that purported
to prohibit private discriminatory conduct interfering with the
suffrage right of another was beyond the enumerated power
granted to Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment and was,
therefore, unconstitutional. ss Thus, like the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Fifteenth Amendment was subjected to the "state action
doctrine." 9 For the next forty years, the state action doctrine was
not considered by the Court in connection with a Fifteenth
Amendment case.9°
In Giles v. Harris,91 a case decided the same term as Bowman,
the petitioner, on behalf of himself and over 5000 African American
citizens of the State of Alabama, sought an order requiring the state
to add their names to its voting list.92 The African Americans
alleged that a conspiracy by Alabama officials had prevented
qualified African Americans from being registered to vote.9 3 Justice
Holmes's majority opinion refused to grant the equitable relief
sought.9 4 The majority's view was that the relief sought (a judicial
order simply adding their names to the voting roster) would have
been an "empty form" that would not have defeated the alleged
conspiracy by the "mass of the white population [who] intend[ed]
to keep the blacks from voting." 9 Instead, the majority suggested
that the petitioner apply to the federal legislative or executive
Congress undertakes to protect the citizen in the exercise of rights conferred by the
Constitution." Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 666.
87. 190.U.S. 127 (1903).
88. Id. at 136. Bowman, a private individual, not connected with the state in any
manner, was indicted under section 5 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, for bribing and
intimidating African Americans to prevent them from exercising their right to vote. Id. at
127. The majority held that the Fifteenth "Amendment relates solely to action 'by the United
States or by any state,' and does not contemplate wrongful individual acts. It is in this
respect similar to the... 14th Amendment." Id. at 136. "A statute which purports to punish
purely individual action cannot be sustained as an appropriate exercise of the power
conferred by the 15th Amendment. . . ." Id. at 139.
89. State action is identified by "determining whether an action [has] ... a sufficiently
close nexus [to the state such] .. .that the action may fairly be treated as that of the state
itself." BLACK's LAW DICTONARY 1407 (6th ed. 1991).
90. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) (holding that because the
defendants' action was state action, the defendants can not challenge the Constitutionality of
the 1957 Civil Rights Act's application to private discriminatory action).
91. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
92. Id. at 482.
93. Id. at 482-83.
94. Id. at 486.
95. Id. at 488.
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96
branch in order to obtain a remedy.
. It was not until 1915 in Guinn v. United States97 that the Court
finally delivered a judgement that provided a major Fifteenth
Amendment victory. In Guinn, the State of Oklahoma openly
excluded African Americans from voting through an amendment to
its constitution that established a voter literacy test and included a
"grandfather clause" to allow previously registered white voters to
vote without passing the tests.98 The Court recognized the validity
of voter literacy tests in general because the Fifteenth Amendment
does not take away States' authority to set voting requirements. 99
However, the Court also recognized that States' power over
suffrage is limited by the self-executing effect of the Fifteenth
Amendment, so that States may not impose voter eligibility
requirements which "abridge or deny the right of a citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." 1°° Therefore, having found that the
grandfather clause established by Oklahoma was merely a means of
perpetuating a discriminatory voter standard that existed before the
passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court held the State's
amendment to be unconstitutional. 011
Similar to the decision in Guinn, the Court invalidated a
grandfather .clause in Lane v. Wilson. 1°2 Early in 1916, the
Oklahoma legislature enacted a new registration law that granted
permanent voting privileges to all persons who were registered to
vote during the 1914 election, registered voters being limited to
those persons under the pre-Guinn grandfather clause suffrage
scheme, and gave all others otherwise eligible in 1916 only twelve
days to register to vote or be disenfranchised in the state
for life. 03 The Court easily found this "grandfathering" of the
invalidated grandfather clause violative of the Fifteenth
Amendment. 1°4 The Supreme Court continued to follow the

96. Giles, 189 U.S. at 488.
97. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
98. Id. at 357.
99. Id. at 362.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 364-68.
102. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
103. Id. at 269-71. A limited exception was made for ill or absent persons. Id.
104. Id. at 275. Justice Frankfurter held that "[t]he [Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies
sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. It hits onerous procedural
requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race
although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to race." Id.
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important precedent established in Guinn to invalidate both subtle
and blatant state methods designed to disenfranchise African
10 5
Americans through state voting laws.
However, the Court exhibited indecision when African Americans
were barred from voting in primary elections. °6 This indecision
stemmed from its struggle over the issue of
whether state action was present when party organizations having
various types of connections with the state excluded African
Americans from voting. 107 In early cases dealing with the so-called
"white primaries," 0 8 the Court opined that such primaries were not
elections to which the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
applied.' °9 However, in a Texas White Primary Case, Nixon v.
Herndon, the actions of the State of Texas in denying African
Americans the right to vote, by statute, in its primary elections
were analyzed.110 The unanimous Court, without considering
whether the statute also violated the Fifteenth Amendment, found
the Texas law to be an obvious violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' In the events giving rise to
105. See, e.g., Davis v. Schnell, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (requiring prospective voters to
show that they could "understand and explain" Constitutional articles in order to register
violates the Fifteenth Amendment); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) (stating that a
Maryland grandfather clause violates the Fifteenth Amendment).
106. Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principleand Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in
the Progressive Era, Part 3: Black Disenfranchisementfrom the KKK to the Grandfather
Clause, 82 CoLuM. L REV. 835 (1982).

107. Id. at 898.
108. In the White Primary Cases, the Supreme Court applied the Fifteenth Amendment
to strike down a collection of measures by Texas officials to exclude African American
voters from primary elections. See generally Marcia Johnson, The Systematic Denial of the
Right to Vote to America's Minorities, 11 HARv. BLAcKLerrER J. 61, 66. The succession of
White Primary Cases is Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); and
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Johnson, supra, at 67.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (holding that the rights
conferred by Article I, § 2 of the Constitution are secured against individual actions as well
as against state action, unlike those guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments).
110. 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
111. Id. at 540-41. "We find it unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amendment,
because it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement of the
Fourteenth. That Amendment, while it applies to all, was passed... with a special intent to
protect the blacks from discrimination against them." Id. "The statute of Texas in the teeth
of... [its] prohibitions... assumes to forbid negroes to take part in a primary election...
discriminating against them by the distinction of color alone." Id. at 541. "[Ilt is too clear for
extended argument that color cannot be made the basis of a statutory classification affecting
the right set up in this case." Id.
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Nixon v. Condon,I" another Texas White Primary Case, the State of
Texas attempted to circumvent the holding in Herndon by enacting
a statute that granted the state's political parties the authority to
establish voter eligibility requirements in an effort to place African
American disenfranchisement outside the reach of the Amendments
by operation of the state action doctrine.11 3 The Court, in a
five-to-four decision,11 4 again reversed the dismissal of the suit
because the committee's action was deemed to be State action and,
thus, invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 15 Moreover, the
Court reserved for itself the question of whether actions by
political parties, without any state statutory authority, nevertheless
constitute state action and are, thus, subject to the commands of
1 16
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Three years later, in the case of Grovey v. Townsend,1 1 7 the Court
was faced with the state action issue it reserved in Condon. A
unanimous Court concluded that because the discriminatory
resolution was passed by the party members during a Democratic
convention rather than by the party executive committee acting
under the authority of the state, as in Condon, the discriminatory
action was "voluntary" and did not constitute state action. 18 The
Court further held that party managers' refusal to permit African
Americans to vote in primary elections merely amounted to a
refusal of the privilege of party membership." 9 Consequently, the
Court held that the denial of party membership did not deprive the
petitioner of any right guaranteed by the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments. 12 0
112. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
113. Id. at 81-82.
114. Id. Justice Cardozo delivered the majority opinion. Id. at 81. Justice McReynolds's
dissent was joined by Justice Van Devanter, Justice Sutherland, and Justice Butler. Id. at 106.
115. Id. at 89. "The test is whether... [political party committee members] are to be
classified as representatives of the state to such an extent and in such a sense that the great
restraints of the Constitution set limits to their action." Id.
116. Id. at 88-89. "Whether in given circumstances parties or their committees are
agencies of government within the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth Amendment is a question
which this court will determine for itself." Id.
117. 295 U.S. 45 (1935). Managers of a Texas Democratic primary election refused to
furnish the petitioner an absentee ballot solely because he was African American. Id. at 46.
After the Condon holding, the Texas legislature repealed the statute in which it had
delegated franchise authority to the political parties in order to "disinvolve" the state in the
discriminatory actions of the political parties in a further effort to eliminate any state action
claims. Johnson, supra note 108, at 67.
118. Grovey, 295 U.S. at 52-53.
119. Id. at 55.
120. Id.
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However, in 1944, the Supreme Court, in Smith v. Allwright,121
overruled Grovey 2 2 and declared that when a state delegates by
statute the selection of candidates for public office to political
parties, the political party is, in effect, a state agency. 23 Therefore,
according to the Smith court, a political party's refusal to permit
qualified African Americans to vote in its primary elections solely
because of their race is unconstitutional under the Fifteenth
124
Amendment.
The Court had greater difficulty with Terry v. Adams,125 wherein
North Carolina attempted to evade the holding of Smith by
26
repealing all of its statutes regulating primary elections.
Consequently, when the Jaybird Democratic Association, a political
organization that controlled primary elections, refused to allow
African Americans to participate in primaries, the organization
claimed that because it was not regulated by the state, its actions
were not governed by the Fifteenth Amendment. 127 Although the
Court found that the Fifteenth Amendment had been violated, 128 the
29
majority was unable to agree upon a rationale for the holding.
In 1960, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,3 0 the Supreme Court, in a
unanimous decision 3' led by Justice Frankfurter, applied the
121. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Justice Reed delivered the majority opinion. Id. Justice
Frankfurter concurred in the result. Id. at 666. Justice Roberts dissented. Id.
122. Id. at 666.
123. Id. at 663-65..
124. Id. at 664-66.
125. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
126. Id. at 465-66.
127. Id. at 462-63.
128. Id. at 469.
129. Id. Chief Justice Vinson, along with Justices Clark, Reed and Jackson believed
that Smith controlled the instant case because the two cases were indistinguishable. Id.
481-82. Justice Frankfurter was of the opinion that elected officials, because of their
participation in organizing the Jaybird Association in a manner that would defeat the law,
could not by that subversion, divest it of state authority. Id. at 475-76. Justices Black,
Douglas, and Burton shared the view that whenever the state permits a private entity to
assume functions normally performed by the state, that private entity's actions are state
actions subject to the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 468-70. Justice Minton
dissented. Id at 484.
130. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
131. Id. at 349. Justice Whittaker concurred in the result, but would have rested the
decision on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not the Fifteenth
Amendment. Id. In his view, transferring voters from one voting district to another does not
abridge those voters' Fifteenth Amendment rights because they remain entitled to vote in the
new district, a right also shared by others in the same district. Id. However, when, as in the
present case, the moving of voters was for the purpose of racial segregation such action
violates equal protection. Id. In subsequent racial gerrymandering cases, the Court adopted
Justice Whittaker's reasoning and abandoned Fifteenth Amendment adjudication in this area
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Fifteenth Amendment and held unconstitutional the sophisticated
disenfranchising technique 13 known as racial gerrymandering.13
The State of Alabama had redrawn the boundaries of Tuskegee,
changing the shape of the city from a square into an "uncouth
twenty-eight sided figure." 13 The effect of this change was to
remove all but four or five of Tuskegee's African American resident
voters from the city limits, while retaining every white resident
voter.35 The Court reasoned that the discriminatory treatment of
black voters violated the Fifteenth Amendment by depriving them
of the benefits of residence in the city, including the right to vote
136
in the city.
In 1964, in Wright v. Rockefeller, Latino and African American
voters alleged that a New York statute that reapportioned
congressional districts resulted in racially segregated districts in
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.' 37 The
Wright Court rejected the constitutional challenge, finding that
despite evidence "that the New York Legislature was either
motivated by racial considerations or in fact drew the districts on
racial lines," plaintiffs had still not proven that the legislature's
districting was done on the basis of race, becuase the evidence
presented could support other inferences 38 Shortly after this
decision, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965139 to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment by addressing direct and indirect
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (approving Justice Wittaker's concurrence in
GomiUion and concluding that racial gerrymandering violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
132. GomiUion, 364 U.S. at 342. "It is difficult to appreciate what stands in the way of
adjudging a statute having this inevitable effect invalid in light of the principles by which this
Court must judge, and uniformly has judged, statutes that, howsoever speciously defined,
obviously discriminate against colored citizens," Id. "The [Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies
sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination." Id. (quoting Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)).
133. Gerrymandering is defined as "the process of dividing a state or other territory,
into the authorized civil or political divisions, but with such a geographical arrangement as
to accomplish an ulterior or unlawful purpose." BLACK'S LAW DIcTioNARY 687 (6th ed. 1990).
134. GomiUion, 364 U.S. at 340.
135. Id. at 341.
136. Id. at 346. The Court also held that the issue presented was not a nonjusticiable
political question. Id. at 346-47. "While in form this is merely an act redefining metes and
bounds . . . the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to
despoil colored citizens, and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights."
Id. at 347.
137. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
138. Id. at 56-58.
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 1973gg-10 (1994). Congressional power to establish the Voting
Rights Act derives from United States Constitution Amendment Fifteen, section two, which
provides: "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
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interference with African American voting rights such as literacy
and voter eligibility tests. 140 The Supreme Court has upheld and
broadly applied various provisions of the Act since its passage.14 1 In
1966, the act was directly challenged in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach.142 Katzenbach arose from South Carolina's desire to
change its election laws without following Voting Rights Act
procedures by seeking an injunction against enforcement of the
Act's provisions. 143 The Court denied South Carolina's request,
reasoning that Congress had faithfully exercised its enforcement
power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.'" Specifically,
the Court held that section 2 authorized Congress to transcend
mere bans on discriminatory state action by enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment requirement that measures be rationally related to the
Amendment's legitimate enforcement purpose.145 The nearly
unanimous decision, 146 that established a rational basis standard of
review, provided Congress with broad discretion to enact
47
affirmative remedial Fifteenth Amendment enforcement laws.
In 1980, in City of Rome v. United States,14 the Court, applying
the rational basis test, held that Congress had the authority, under
section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, to prohibit electoral devices
that have a discriminatory effect even if the prohibited practice,
140. DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP; AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 213 (1991).

141. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965) (stating that the Attorney
General is authorized to sue for injunctive relief to protect citizens' right to vote, the states
may be subjected to suit, and suits can not be defeated by the resignation of election official
defendants); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (finding that reasonable
interpretation tests violate the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act).
142. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
143. Id. at 308.
144. Id. at 337. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment states, "Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. See also
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (approving the scope of the Civil Rights Act as
a valid enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment).
145. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324-27.
146. Id. at 355. Justice Black dissented from the portion of the opinion upholding the
Attorney General's prior approval requirement for states to amend their voting statutes. Id.
147. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding a ban- on a state's use
of literacy tests); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971) (upholding required Attorney
General or district court preapproval of changes in polling places and the annexation of
property to a city that might lessen the voting strength of racial minorities); United States v.
Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110 (1978) (holding that the Voting Rights Act applies to all entities
having power over any aspect of voting).
148. 446 U.S. 156 (1980). The City of Rome attempted to show that it had not utilized
any discriminatory voting practices within the period prescribed in the Voting Rights Act in
an effort to avoid the preclearance edicts of the Act. Id. at 170-72.
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alone, would not violate the Fifteenth Amendment. 49 The Court
reasoned that Congress could do so "because electoral changes by
jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of purposeful
discrimination in voting create a risk of purposeful
discrimination . . . . [Therefore, Congress can] prohibit changes
that have a discriminatory impact."150
In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 15 1 a case decided the same day as
Rome, the Court held that the use of at-large elections 52 for
members of a city commission did not violate the Voting Rights Act
or the Fifteenth Amendment absent a demonstration of racially
discriminatory intent even though no minority member had ever
been elected to the commission. 1 3 In a fractured plurality
opinion, 4 Justice Stewart contradicted past interpretations of the
Fifteenth Amendment by asserting that it concerned only acts of
purposeful discrimination. 55 In addition, Justice Stewart's plurality
149. Id. at 177. "It is clear, then, that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress
may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of the Amendment, so
long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting are 'appropriate.' " Id. "We
hold that the Act's ban on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect is an
appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment, even if it is
assumed that § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination in voting." Id.
at 177.
150. Id.
151. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
152. In an at-large electoral system, each candidate runs citywide instead of running
for individual wards. See generally ALEXANDER J. Borr, HANDBOOK OF UNITED STATES ELEcTION
LAWs AND PRACTICES 204-07 (1990). Each voter casts ballots for each of the council seats,
rather than for just his or her own ward. Id. Because the citywide majority chooses all the
candidates, such a system tends to decrease the influence of minority groups. Id.
153. Bolden, 466 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion). The plaintiffs also charged that the
scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 58. The
Court required that the plaintiffs show evidence of purposeful discrimination to prevail in
this claim. Id. at 66.
154. Id. at 57. Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Id. at 55. Justice
Blacknun concurred only in the result because he thought that the district court's remedy
was improper even though he agreed that there might be a basis for finding purposeful
discrimination. Id. at 80. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment of the Court; however,
his analysis focused on the objective effects of the change in the voting laws or voting
practices rather than the "subjective motivation of the decisionmaker." Id. at 90. Justice
White dissented because he believed that the plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing of a
racially discriminatory purpose. Id. at 103. Justices Brennan and Marshall, in separate
dissenting opinions, argued that proof of discriminatory impact on minority race voters was
sufficient to show a violation of the Voting Rights Act as well as the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. Id. at 94, 103.
155. Id. at 62. Justice Stewart based his opinion, with which only three other Justices
joined, on interpretations of Guinn, Gomillion, and Wright. Id. at 62-63. Compare Bolden,
446 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion) (characterizing Guinn as requiring a discriminatory purpose
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opinion limited the protection provided by the Fifteenth
Amendment by interpreting it as guaranteeing no more than the
right to cast a vote.156
In 1982, in response to the Borden decision, Congress amended
the Voting Rights Act 57 to make clear that a violation of section 2
could be proven by showing a discriminatory result alone, rather
than having to show a discriminatory purpose as Justice Stewart
demanded in Borden.1 58 In the vote dilution case Thornburg v.
Gingles, the Court upheld the amended provision of the Act,
thereby discarding the purposeful discrimination standard for
to find a Fifteenth Amendment violation), with Guinn, 238 U.S. at 365 (holding that a law
with no rational purpose other than to deny or abridge a person's right to vote violates the
Fifteenth Amendment); compare Bolden, 446 U.S. at 63 (plurality opinion) (characterizing
GomiUion as holding that "in the absence of such an invidious purpose, a State is
Constitutionally free to redraw boundaries in any manner it chooses"), with Gomillion, 364
U.S. at 347 (explaining that "[wihile in form this is merely an act redefining metes and
bounds, . . . the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to
despoil colored citizens... of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights."); compare Bolden, 446
U.S. at 63 (plurality opinion) (characterizing Wright as supporting the principle that an
invidious purpose must be presented), with Wright, 376 U.S. at 56 (holding that the plaintiffs
failed to prove that the legislature "was either motivated by racial considerations or in fact
drew the districts on racial lines").
156. Bolden, 466 U.S. at 64-65. "The Fifteenth Amendment does not entail the right to
have a Negro candidate elected . . . . The Amendment prohibits only purposefully
discriminatory denial or abridgement by government of the freedom to vote on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Id. at 65. See also Justice Marshall's
dissenting opinion criticizing the plurality's view of the Fifteenth Amendment's right to vote
as "providing the politically powerless with nothing more than the right to cast meaningless
ballots." Id. at 104.
157. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134. Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, now reads as follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973 b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b)
of this title.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of
a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is
one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
158. See Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

2000

Rice v. Cayetano

purposes of establishing a violation of the Voting Rights Act. 159 The
Court did not, however, discuss the Borden plurality's purposeful
discrimination requirement in relation to Fifteenth Amendment
claims, the applicability of which, to date, the Court has not
decided. 16

Rice differs from the Fifteenth Amendment cases that have
preceded it because it arose from a State's attempt to
disenfranchise all nonmembers of a specific racial minority group
as opposed to an attempt to disenfranchise the minority group
itself. However, this distinction should not and does not have any
effect upon the outcome of the case because the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibits disenfranchisement on the basis of race
regardless of whether the race being disenfranchised is within or
without a specific racial minority group. 61 The State of Hawaii
initially argued that its voter eligibility statute did not abridge the
rights of voters because the scheme did not limit franchise
privileges to only "Hawaiians" as a race but, rather, as a political or
beneficiary group. 62 The Court appropriately rejected Hawaii's
contention because the State's own definition of the term
"Hawaiian," as set forth in its statutory history, clearly contradicted
that argument.'63 Additionally, the voting scheme at issue was
established by state statute for a state agency election.1 4 While the
status of native Hawaiians and their relationship with the United
States govermment are complex issues, 165 the resolution of this case
regarding the Fifteen Amendment is decidedly uncomplicated. No
more than the following two facts are necessary to find a violation
of the Fifteenth Amendment, i.e., state abridgement of the right to
vote on the basis of race. 166 Therefore, Hawaii's voter eligibility
159. Id. at 71. "[The] suggestion that the discriminatory intent of individual white
voters must be proved in order to make out a § 2 claim must fail for the very reasons
Congress rejected the intent test with respect to governmental bodies." Id.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Reese, 92 U.S. at 217. By its plain language, the Fifteenth Amendment
provides the right to be free from discrimination in voting. Id. at 218.
162. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1055.
163. Id. at 1056.:
164. Id. at 1059. "OHA elections, by contrast, are the affair of the State of Hawaii. OHA
is a state agency, established by the State Constitution, responsible for the administration of
state laws and obligations." Id.
165. For opposing viewpoints, compare Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the
Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L & PoL'y REV. 95 (1998), with Stuart Minor Benjamin,
Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE LJ
537 (1996).
166. See Roger Clegg, Can Racial Bias Ever Be Legal?; DOJ Strains to Legitimize
Hawaii Law That Violates 15th Amendment, FULTON CouNTY DAILY REPolrr, August 17, 1999,
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scheme clearly violates the Fifteenth Amendment.
The majority opinion in Rice made no determination as to the
constitutionality of the OHA structure or the underlying public trust
benefiting native Hawaiians.'6 7 Nevertheless, the Court's analysis
reveals that racial entitlement programs, such as the ORA, might be
found unconstitutional because the arguments presented to the
Court concerning Indian tribes, special trust relationships, and
Hawaiian history were carefully reviewed by the majority and
rejected.' 68 As a result, challenges are already underway.6 9 An
additional issue is whether non-Hawaiians can run for the office of
OHA trustee. Legal experts are divided as to whether the Rice
decision invalidates the native Hawaiian qualification for
trusteeship.' 7 As a result, several non-Hawaiians are said to be
17
considering running for OHA trustee. '
The State of Hawaii and the OHAs reaction to the decision is a
case of history repeating itself. Initially, the OHA considered
"privatizing" its trustee elections by paying for the election through
OHA funds, 172 an action that is highly reminiscent of the White
Primary cases. After receiving legal advice that such action would
not make the voting requirement any less unconstitutional, the
OHA board approved two draft bills to create a private entity to
which they can transfer the trust assets. 7 3 However, the greatest
response has been renewed momentum in the direction of
7
Hawaiian sovereignty.1'
Currently, there appears to be three distinct approaches to
at 6 (noting that one scholar suggested that Rice need only read to the Supreme Court the
Hawaii statute and the 15th Amendment to gain a favorable result).
167. Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1059.
168. Id. at 1057-60. A great deal of money is at stake. In recent years the OHA has
been awarded more than $440 million through legislation and grants. Pat Omandam,
Hawaiian Funding Tops $440 Million, HONOLULU STAR-BuauzN, March 20, 2000.
169. See, e.g, Pat Omandam, Group Challenges Paying Ceded-land Funds to OHA,
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, March 29, 2000 (reporting that a group of Hawaii residents claim
that the state should not make ceded-land revenue payments to the OHA because the laws
that created the OHA were based on racial classifications that are forbidden under the
United States Constitution).
170. Christine Donnelly, Non-Hawaiians Will Sue to Run for OHA, HONOLULU
STAR-BuLLETIN, March 30, 2000, at Al.

171. Id.
172. See Pat Omandam, OHA Board Abandons Proposal to Fund Its Own Separate
Elections, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, March 17, 2000, at A3.
173. Id.
174. Christine Donnelly and Lucy Young-Oda, In Wake of Rice vs. Cayetano, What
Happens Now? HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, March 20, 2000, at Supp. 1.
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achieving Hawaiian sovereignty.7 5 The first approach is to add
language to certain bills that clarifies the native Hawaiian and
federal government trust relationship. 17 6 A second sovereignty
approach has been termed "nation within a nation" and is similar to
the treatment of Native American governments in the continental
United States and in Alaska. 177 Under this approach, a native
Hawaiian nation would have direct government-to-government
relations with the United States and would enjoy a level of
autonomy that would include the authority to define its own
membership and to restrict elections solely to its own members. 78
The third and most radical sovereignty approach calls for the
79
decolonization or secession of Hawaii.
Regardless of the paths taken concerning native Hawaiian issues,
it appears that the people of the State of Hawaii are in for a time
of political, racial, and legal uncertainty for the foreseeable future.
When considering any action, all of Hawaii's citizens would be best
served by taking to heart Justice Kennedy's gentle reminder, "The
Constitution of the United States, too, has become the heritage of
80
all the citizens of Hawaii."
Tina L. Corcoran

175. Christine Donnelly, Several Ways to Approach Sovereignty, HONOLULU
STAR-BULLETIN, March 20, 2000; Pat Omandam, From Decolonization to the Privatization of
OHA, the Dialogue is Ongoing, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, March 20, 2000.
176. Christine Donnelly, Several Ways to Approach Sovereignty, HONOLULU
STAR-BULLETIN, March 20, 2000.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.; See also Pat Omandam, From Decolonization to the Privatizationof OHA, the
Dialogue is Ongoing, HONOLULU STAR-BuLLETIN, March 20, 2000.
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Rice, 120 S. Ct. at 1060.

